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NOTES
RULE 10b-5 AND THE DUTY TO
DISCLOSE MARKET INFORMATION:
IT TAKES A THIEF
INTRODUCTION
Rule 10b-5,1 adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) in 1942 pursuant to its rule-making power under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 prohibits "any
person" from making materially inaccurate or incomplete state-
ments or employing any other fraudulent scheme or practice in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.3 Neither the
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) reads in pertinent part-
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
3 Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
tances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). For a discussion of the body of law that has accumulated
under rule lOb-5, see A. BROMBERG, SEcuarrms LAw: FRAUD (1977); 5 A. JAcoBs, THE IMPAcT
OF RuLE lOb-5 (1980).
Several remedies have been created for violations of the statute and the rule. A viola-
tion of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 is criminally punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, im-
prisonment for up to 5 years, or both. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976). In addition, the SEC is au-
thorized to seek injunctive relief against "any person [who] is engaged or is about to engage
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statute nor the rule, however, expressly creates liability for mere
nondisclosure of material nonpublic information.4 Reflecting com-
mon-law notions of fiduciary responsibility, 5 courts traditionally
imposed an affirmative disclosure obligation under rule 10b-5 only
on "insiders, '" persons standing in a relation of trust and confi-
dence to the issuer of the securities.7 More recently, the courts'
and the SEC9 have demonstrated an inclination to extend the an-
in acts or practices constituting a violation" of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. 15 U.S.C. §
78u(d) (1976). The courts have also granted ancillary or equitable remedies, including, inter
alia, disgorgement of profits and rescission. E.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2A 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Center, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Finally, under various provisions of the Securi-
ties Act of 1934, several administrative remedies may be pursued by the SEC for violations
of rule 10b-5 by brokers, dealers, members of a national securities exchange, or a member of
the National Association of Securities Dealers. See generally Jacobs, Judicial and Adminis-
trative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches of Rule 10b-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv.
397, 422-34 (1979). The remedies available to the SEC for violation of section 10(b) or rule
10b-5 do not exhaust the extent of the wrongdoer's possible liability. Although there is no
express provision within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which provides for civil liabil-
ity for breach of the rule, an implied private right of action has nonetheless been recognized
for over 30 years. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
' See notes 49-50 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra.
Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
The term "insider" traditionally has been held to encompass only those persons sub-
ject to the proscriptions against "short swing" trading under section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), which applies to officers, directors, and to ten
percent shareholders of the corporation issuing the security involved. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra
note 3, at § 66.02[a]. For the last decade, however, "tippees" of the foregoing classes of
persons also have been held to be "insiders" within the ambit of rule 10b-5's affirmative
duty of disclosure. See note 100 and accompanying text infra.
I See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1979); Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365
(2d Cii. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Lewelling v. First California Co., 564 F.2d 1277,
1280 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Hall, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,292 (D.D.C. 1980).
See Marcus, Lawyer Charged With Insider Trading, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1980, at 6,
col. 2; Miller, S.E.C. Cracking Down on Trading By Insiders, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1980, at
D1, col. 1. According to Theodore A. Levine, associate director of the SEC's enforcement
division, there has been an increase in insider trading in recent years primarily because of
the quick profits that can be made by trading on advance knowledge of an impending tender
offer. Miller, supra, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1980, at D6, col. 5. Indeed, SEC officials are re-
ported to have said that "few insider transactions are actually spotted and that such trading
is rampant." Id.
In an effort to hasten the trend expanding the 10b-5 duty of disclosure, the SEC accel-
erated its enforcement activity in the area of insider trading. This "commission crackdown"
has been aimed in part at persons other than the traditional "insider." Commenting on the
first case in which the SEC successfully sought injunctive relief under rule 10b-5 against the
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tifraud protections of the rule beyond these common-law parame-
ters, indicating that an affirmative disclosure obligation might ap-
ply to any person in possession of material nonpublic information
with knowledge that it is not available to the public generally.10
This trend was checked, however, by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Chiarella v. United States," which held that in the
absence of a relation of trust and confidence between the parties, 2
mere possession of material nonpublic information generated by
sources outside the issuer does not give rise to a disclosure obliga-
tion under rule 10b-5. 3
The rule 10b-5 duty to disclose is an element to be proved in
private actions and SEC enforcement proceedings based on fraud-
ulent nondisclosure, as well as in criminal prosecutions by the Jus-
tice Department.24 Therefore, although Chiarella arose in a crimi-
nal context, it is likely to have ramifications on all aspects of 10b-5
enforcement. This Note will conclude that the Supreme Court's
special relationship standard is a departure from well-reasoned
lower court and SEC decisions and will constitute an impediment
to the effective enforcement of rule 10b-5 by all potential com-
plainants. Initially, the Note will trace the development of the 10b-
5 disclosure obligation from its common-law origins through the
significant nondisclosure precedent under the statute and the rule.
Emphasis will be placed on those classes of persons subject to a
duty to disclose. After an examination of Chiarella itself, the im-
plications of the decision for the potential liability of tippees and
outsiders will be discussed. Finally, the effect of Chiarella on the
private right of action under rule 10b-5 and on the injunctive
powers of the SEC will be analyzed.
issuer's counsel, see SEC v. Hall, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 97,292
(D.D.C. 1980), Mr. Levine stated that the Hall case "shouldn't be viewed as anything more
than the Commission saying that nobody's immune from insider trading restrictions." Mar-
cus, supra, at 6, col. 2 (emphasis added).
'0 See Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
" 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
,Id. at 227.
23 Id.
14 See 5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 3, § 263, at 11-289.
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FROM FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS TO POSSESSION OF INSIDE
INFORMATION
Nondisclosure at Common Law
The common law generally recognized a cause of action for de-
ceit based on half-truths or misrepresentations; no such action lay,
however, for mere nondisclosure of material facts within the
knowledge of one party to a transaction.15 Based on a competitive
business ethic, this rule rewarded a party's diligence and business
acumen by permitting him to exploit another's ignorance, provided
he did not actively mislead the other.16 Although such conduct
could be viewed as morally contemptible, the preservation of mo-
rality was not considered the function of the courts.17 "Simple reti-
cence," said Lord Campbell over a century ago, "does not amount
to legal fraud, however it may be viewed by moralists."18
An exception to this general rule arose when the party in pos-
session of undisclosed material information was under a duty to
disclose it.19 Ordinarily, an obligation to speak was not found ab-
sent a fiduciary relationship between the parties.20 Thus, for exam-
ple, a duty to disclose was imposed where the relationship between
the parties was that of principal-agent, executor-beneficiary, or
15 Boileau v. Records & Breen, 165 Iowa 134, 144 N.W. 336, 338 (1913); Crowell v. Jack-
son, 53 N.J.L. 656, 657, 23 A. 426, 427 (1891); Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 E.&I. App. 377, 403
(1873); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule X-1OB-5, 40 MINN. L. Rzv. 62, 63 (1955); Note, Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability Ex-
tended as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. Rlv. 866, 876 (1979).
" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 695-96 (4th ed. 1971). Ordi-
narily in any transaction between two or more parties, there will be one party who, because
of his diligence and shrewdness, will possess superior knowledge. Despite this fact, he nor-
mally is under no obligation to offer it to the less informed since an individual is entitled to
benefit from his superior insight. See Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders
Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 56-57 (1960); Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclo-
sure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W. REs. L. Rsv. 5, 9 (1956).
17 See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933); Rothmiller v.
Stein, 143 N.Y. 581, 590-91, 38 N.E. 718, 720 (1894); Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 E.&I. App. 377,
403 (1873); Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 9.
18 Walters v. Morgan, 45 Eng. Rep. 1056, 1059 (1861).
19 Copper Processing Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co., 262 F. 66, 73 (3d Cir. 1920);
Peoples' Bank v. Bogart, 81 N.Y. 101, 107 (1880); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(1977).
11 Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 32; Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure,
15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 11 (1936); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977). An affirma-
tive disclosure obligation also has been imposed on a party when he knows that the other
party with whom he is contracting is relying on his silence and is mistaken as to a material
fact. See Bank v. Board of Educ., 305 N.Y. 119, 111 N.E.2d 238 (1953).
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trustee-cestui que trust. 1 No such duty existed, however, where
the relation of the parties was merely that of vendor and pur-
chaser.2 2 As one commentator has noted, a vendor at common law
was "hardly ever" under an obligation to disclose, and a purchaser.
was "almost never" under such an obligation. 5
Prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws, these
principles were equally applicable in securities transactions: the
duty of disclosure was triggered only if a relationship of trust and
confidence could be established between purchaser and seller.2 4
Consequently, the issue of liability for nondisclosure frequently
arose in a corporate fiduciary context. In these early cases, the
courts were presented with the question whether a fiduciary obli-
gation was owed by corporate officers or directors to the corpora-
tion's stockholders individually.2 5 Under traditional fiduciary con-
cepts, if corporate management were deemed to serve in a fiduciary
capacity vis-a-vis the individual stockholders, an officer or director
would be required to divulge any material information which he
had obtained by virtue of his position before effecting a purchase
of the corporation's securities.26 The courts, however, were split on
this issue.27 An early majority view held that while an officer or
director owed fiduciary duties to the corporation which he served
and to its stockholders collectively, he did not have fiduciary re-
sponsibilities to individual stockholders merely because of his posi-
tion.2 8 It was reasoned that the affairs of the company were con-
structively known to the shareholders since the books of the
21 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 696 (4th ed. 1971); Keeton,
supra note 20, at 11.
22 See Noved Realty Corp. v. A.A.P. Co., 250 App. Div. 1, 5, 293 N.Y.S. 336, 340 (1st
Dep't 1937); Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 39-40.
Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 26.
34 See Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, 657, 23 A. 426, 427 (1891); Rothmiller v. Stein,
143 N.Y. 581, 591-92, 38 N.E. 718, 719-20 (1894).
" See Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L.
Rav. 827 (1927); Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE L.J.
731 (1918); Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8
MICH. L. Rav. 267 (1910).
" See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
" See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 80 (rev. ed. 1946); 3A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF TH LAW OF PRivATS CoRPoRATioNs §§ 1167-1174 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
2See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho
464, 196 P. 208 (1921); Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905); Walsh
v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, 23 A. 426
(1891); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865); Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co.,
132 Tenn. 210, 177 S.W. 479 (1915).
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corporation were open to examination.2" Moreover, in dealing with
an officer or director, a stockholder could elicit any undisclosed in-
formation by inquiring as to whether the officer or director pos-
sessed any secret knowledge.30 Thus, it was concluded that officers
and directors could trade as "outsiders" without disclosing non-
public information in their possession as long as they did not af-
firmatively act or speak wrongfully.31
A minority of courts rejected the "constructive knowledge"
theory as inconsistent with economic reality.32 According to this
view, it would be virtually impossible for an ordinary shareholder
in a large publicly held corporation to be privy to the same infor-
mation to which an officer or director had access.3 The minority
courts concluded that although officers and directors were not
strictly trustees for shareholders, they were nonetheless "quasi-
trustees" with respect to the individual stockholder's shares."
When trading in securities of their own corporation, therefore, of-
ficers and directors acted "in a relation of scrupulous trust and
confidence. 3 5 The minority also noted that the paramount duty of
a corporate agent to maintain the secrecy of confidential corporate
information was not a license to use that secret information to the
disadvantage of shareholders to whom he was also responsible.3 6
" Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 212 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Il1. 1962); Walsh v.
Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902).
10 If a stockholder made an affirmative inquiry about the condition of the company, the
officer or director had to respond truthfully. Otherwise, he was answerable in damages to
the stockholder. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Del. 1943); Waller v.
Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 283 S.W. 1047 (1926).
31 Hooker v. Midland Steel Co. 215 Ill. 444, 451, 74 N.E. 445, 447 (1905); Shaw v. Cole
Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 213, 177 S.W. 479, 480 (1915).
32 The majority view also has been criticized by most text writers and commentators as
"a rule of unconscionable laxity." H. BALLAzmNE, CORPORATIONS § 80, at 212-13 (rev. ed.
1946).
"s Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.2d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 1934); see Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362,
368, 45 S.E. 232, 234-35 (1903).
1 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530,
16 P.2d 531 (1932); Markey v. Hibernia Homestead Ass'n, 186 So. 757 (La. Ct. App. 1939);
Staker v. Reese, 82 W. Va. 764, 97 S.E. 641 (1919). As Judge Lamar, later Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, stated in Oliver.
No process of reasoning and no amount of argument can destroy the fact that the
director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the stockholder.
Not a strict trustee, . but a quasi trustee as to the stockholder's interest in the
shares.
118 Ga. at 367, 45 S.E. at 233-34.
35 See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 368, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903).
38 Id.
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"The very fact that [an officer or director] cannot disclose prevents
him from dealing with one who does not know, and to whom mate-
rial information cannot be made known."'37
Subsequently, an intermediate position arose which in large
part adopted the minority "disclose or refrain from trading" rule.""
Under this view, the officer or director had a fiduciary responsi-
bility to disclose material nonpublic information if there existed
certain "special facts" which could significantly affect the value of
the stockholder's shares, yet were not ascertainable by examination
of the corporation's books.3 ' These special circumstances included
imminent and extraordinary corporate action, such as an impend-
ing merger or other corporate reorganization, or a liquidation.40
This position eventually was adopted by a majority of
jurisdictions. 1
The common-law duty to disclose nonpublic corporate infor-
mation, however, continued to have limited application.4'2 An of-
ficer or director's obligation to disclose, if it existed at all, was pre-
mised on either a fiduciary relationship or one of trust and
37 Id.
" One commentator has described this intermediate viewpoint as "a compromise be-
tween the laissez faire attitude of [the majority] cases and the paternalistic philosophy of
the [minority] cases." W. PAnmR, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADINo 17 (1968).
3 See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Inl. App. 153, 63
N.E.2d 630 (1945); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925); Fischer v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1940). See also Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 22, 228 n.10. In Strong, the defendant was a director and owner of
three-fourths of the shares in a corporation whose single valuable asset was land. 213 U.S. at
421. After nearing completion of negotiations for the sale of the corporation's land at a
sizable sum, the defendant, through his agent, purchased the plaintiff's shares in the corpo-
ration without disclosing the negotiations for the sale of the land. Id. Had the plaintiff re-
tained her shares until the completion of the land sale, she would have realized ten times
the amount which she received from the defendant for her shares. Id. at 422. Justice
Peckham concluded that while the mere status of the defendant may have been insufficient
to impose upon him a duty to disclose, id. at 430-31, the "special facts" of the case were
more than enough to hold him to a duty to speak prior to purchasing the shares of other
stockholders, id. at 431. In reaching his conclusion, Justice Peckham observed that the de-
fendant, in addition to being a director, was also the majority shareholder in the corpora-
tion, in charge of its operations, and the chief negotiator for the corporation in the negotia-
tions for the sale of its only valuable asset. Id. at 431.
"I See Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill.
App. 153, 165 N.E.2d 630 (1945).
"I See Note, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1125 (1950).
" 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 3, § 2.01, at 1-12 (1979); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-
10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1125 (1950).
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confidence.4" Therefore, if a director was selling his shares to a
nonshareholder, to whom no fiduciary responsibilities were owing,
he had no duty to divulge material facts which he had obtained by
virtue of his inside position." Nor was a majority shareholder
obliged to disclose corporate information in his possession, even
when dealing with other shareholders. 45 Moreover, there is author-
ity that the duty to disclose was nonexistent, even as to officers
and directors, if the transaction was effected on a national securi-
ties exchange.' 6 Consequently, with few circumstances triggering
an obligation to speak, caveat emptor was the rule of the day.
Nondisclosure Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
The Securities Act of 1933 47and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193448 were enacted to bolster investor confidence in the integ-
rity of organized capital markets by "substitut[ing] a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."'19 Section
43 See Conant, supra note 16, at 59-63; Note, Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability Extended
as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. Rav. 866, 876 (1979).
44 See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); 3
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1455 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, A New Concept of Fraud on
the Securities Exchange-A Comment on In re Cady Roberts & Co., 15 S.C.L. REv. 557,
563-64 (1963).
Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Del. 1943).
" It had never been expressly decided whether trading on undisclosed information
could be the basis of a fraud action when the sale had taken place on a securities exchange.
62 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1962). In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659
(1933), however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed:
Purchases and sales of stock dealt in on the stock exchange are commonly imper-
sonal affairs. An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could
neither buy nor sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation
without first seeking out the other actual ultimate party to the transaction and
disclosing to him everything which a court or jury might later find that he then
knew affecting the real or speculative value of such shares. Business of that nature
is a matter to be governed by practical rules.
Id. at 363, 186 N.E. at 661.
'7 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74.
48 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881.
4 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); see SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 185 (1963); W. LEUCHTENBERG, FDR AND THE
NEw DEAL 90-91 (1963); M. PARRISH, SECuRITIS REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 42-43, 180
(1970); A. SCHLESINGER, HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL 423-24, 457, 470 (1980); Gadsby, Histori-
cal Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 6, 9 (1959);
Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. Rav. 46
(1934). In his message to Congress in support of the legislation that was to become the
Securities Act of 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote: "This proposal adds to the
ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware,' ..... It
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10(b) of the 1934 Act, derived from the broad antifraud provisions
of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,50 prohibits any "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of any rule
promulgated by the SEC as "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 1 Rule 10b-5, adopted
should give to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence." H. R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1933). The problem of restoring investor confidence was
addressed specifically in the report accompanying the original version of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 introduced in the House:
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and corpo-
rations alike, the law must advance. As a complex society so diffuses and differen-
tiates the financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to trust others and
cannot personally watch the managers of all his interests as one horsetrader
watches another, it becomes a condition of the very stability of that society that
its rules of law and of business practice recognize and protect that ordinary citi-
zen's dependent position. Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a
fiduciary relationship-a guarantee of "straight shooting"-supports the constant
extension of mutual confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and compli-
cated economic system, easy liquidity of resources in which wealth is invested is a
danger rather than a prop to the stability of that system.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
60 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); see 3 L. Loss, supra note 44, at 1423. Section 17(a) out-
laws fraud by any person in the sale or offer for sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
Milton Freeman, the author of rule lOb-5, describes its birth as follows:
I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and
the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or
sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said,. . . "We are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
Professor Loss has called this procedure "backdoor jurisprudence with a vengeance." Loss,
History of S.E.C. Legislation Programs and Suggestions for a Code, in Conference on Codi-
fication of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 796 (1967). Despite this criticism,
Loss has said that the promulgation of rule 10b-5 "if anything, received more consideration,
apparently, than § 10(b) itself received." 6 L. Loss, supra note 44, at 3528; see note 51
supra. Although at least one commentator has attacked the promulgation of rule 10b-5 as
procedurally infirm, see Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 473 (1967), the rule has nevertheless survived judicial scrutiny. See Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
51 See note 2 supra. Although the legislative history of section 10(b) is sparse, see
Hanna & Turlington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA.
L. REv. 251, 275 (1935), it does indicate that the section was intended as a "catchall" provi-
sion to "deal with new manipulative or cunning devices." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 203 (1976); see 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at § 2.2. One of the drafters of the
1934 Act commented before the House Committee on Internal and Foreign Commerce:
Subsection (c) says, "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices". . . . Of
course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not
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by the SEC pursuant to this rulemaking power, proscribes the
making of materially false or incomplete statements or any other
fraudulent scheme or practice in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.5 2 While rule 10b-5 expressly forbids affirma-
tive misrepresentations and half-truths, it does not expressly ad-
dress the legality of nondisclosure.53
The earliest decisions interpreting the rule indicated that 10b-
5 was merely a federal codification of the common-law action for
deceit to be applied in securities fraud cases.54 Thus, in accordance
with the principles of common-law fraud, these courts consistently
held that mere silence constituted a fraudulent scheme or practice
within the proscription of the rule only in the presence of a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence.5 5 As a result, while rule 10b-5 lit-
think there is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have
authority to deal with new manipulative devices.
Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before House Comm. on
Internal and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G.
Corcoran) (quoted in 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 2.2).
52 See note 3 supra. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942 to close a "loophole" in the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by prohibiting fraud in the purchase as
well as the sale of securities. SEC Exch. Act. Rel. No. 3230 (May 21, 1942); 8 SEC ANN. REP.
10 (1942); see note 50 supra. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at § 2.2; 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 3, at § 5.
'3 See note 3 supra; Note, Omission and Nondisclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Dis-
tinction in Search of a Difference, FORDHAM UnB. L.J. 423, 425 (1979); 36 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 378, 381 (1962).
4Accord, James Blackstone Mem. Library Ass'n v. Gulf Mobile & Ohio R.R., 264 F.2d
445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 56
(N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); see Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Colo. 1964); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v.
Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 328 n.6 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir.
1957); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955). But see Speed v. Tran-
samerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
*1 See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); Tobacco
& Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d
902 (3d Cir. 1957). The early decisions applying rule 10b-5 did little to remove the obscurity
surrounding the duty of disclosure. See, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). It should be noted that the initial
comments on rule 10b-5 doubted seriously that the rule would ever be applied to a nonin-
sider in a pure nondisclosure case. See Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule X-ZOB-5, 40 MINN. L. REv. 62, 64 (1955); 59 HARv. L. Rv.
769, 774 (1946); 44 ILL. L. Rpv. 841, 841-42 (1950); 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 241, 245 (1963). As
late as 1968, one eminent commentator in the field of securities regulation was to observe:
A careful reading of the bulk of [the rule l6b-5] cases had led the author to
the conclusion that decisions construing Rule lOb-5 are creating no new substan-
tive law of torts. Indeed, the courts seem to be importing into the rule modern
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erally applied to "any person," 6 the requirement of a fiduciary re-
lationship limited its application to officers and directors trading
on nonpublic inside information. In 1951, however, in Speed v.
Transamerica Corp.,57 it was finally established that the duty to
disclose was a discrete statutory creation.58
Transamerica Corp. (Transamerica) owned a majority interest
in Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. (Axton) and controlled its board of
directors."9 By virtue of its position, Transamerica learned that the
cash value of Axton's tobacco inventory greatly exceeded its book
value as reflected in the company's annual financial statement 0
and determined, therefore, to capture this inventory appreciation
through merger or dissolution of Axton."1 As part of this plan,
Transamerica offered to purchase outstanding shares of Axton
class A stock without disclosing its intentions to the selling minor-
ity stockholders and without informing them of the actual value of
the inventory.2 The court held that Transamerica was under a
duty, as majority shareholder, to inform the minority stockholders
of material nonpublic facts to which it had access solely by virtue
of its inside position 63 and that its failure to do so violated rule
10b-5.6 The Speed court grounded its holding, however, on no-
tions of fairness and parity of information, rather than on tradi-
tional corporate fiduciary concepts.65
theories of common law fraud and deceit ....
Jennings, Insider Trading of Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure
Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 809, 814 (1968).
" See note 3 supra; Note, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1142 (1950).
17 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del 1951).
" Compare id. at 829 with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D.
Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
11 99 F. Supp. at 828.
60 Id. In a two-year period, the value of Axton's tobacco inventory had increased by
over $2 million. Id. at 835.
41 Id. at 828. Although this appreciation in value could have been captured through a
simple sale, the resulting gain would have been subjected to heavy taxation, id. at 837. If,
however, Transamerica were able to acquire more than eighty percent of Axton's stock, it
could capture the entire-appreciation through a tax-free dissolution. Id. at 838.
61 Id. at 828; see note 61 supra.
See 99 F. Supp. at 828-29. Apparently the court felt that the disclosure obligation
was founded more on the defendant's relationship to the issuer than on his relationship to
those from whom he purchased. The court emphasized twice that the information which the
defendant failed to disclose was known to it solely "by virtue of its position" in relation to
Axton. Id.
" Id. at 829.
05 See id. The Speed court stated that its decision was not based on the "narrow and
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Speed provided little concrete guidance, however, as to when
an affirmative disclosure obligation would arise under rule 10b-5.6e
Consequently, courts for the next decade continued to explain the
duty to disclose in terms of a fiduciary obligation17 while at the
same time discounting the notion that liability under the rule was
circumscribed by the elements of common-law deceit.88 Then, in
1961, a more definitive standard for applying the 10b-5 disclosure
obligation was enunciated by the SEC in In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.," which indicated that the duty was not limited to situations
where a fiduciary relationship was present.
In Cady, Roberts, the board of directors of the Curtiss-Wright
Corporation voted a quarterly dividend at a lower rate than had
been declared in previous quarters.7 0 During a recess of the board
meeting, one of the directors, who was also a registered representa-
tive of Cady, Roberts & Co., a broker-dealer, telephoned Gintel, a
Cady partner, and left a message that a lower dividend had been
declared.7 1 After receiving this information, Gintel entered sell or-
ders on the New York Stock Exchange for 7,000 shares of Curtiss-
somewhat abstract legalistic" common-law notion of fiduciary relationship, id., a theory
which the court had rejected in a previous case. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 63 F.
Supp. 248 (D. Del.), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945). Instead, Speed held:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
shareholders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining
position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any
such transaction.
99 F. Supp. at 829.
" See also 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 378, 381 (1962).
17 See, e.g., James Blackstone Mem. Library Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 264
F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49
(N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
" See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Moun-
tain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio &
Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883, 887 (2d
Cir. 1952); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951). But see To-
bacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327 (D. Del. 1956),
afl'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
6- 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Cady, Roberts has been the subject of considerable legal com-
mentary, see Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939 (1962);
Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5. The Cady, Roberts
Doctrine, 30 CHI. L. Ray. 121 (1962); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1449 (1962); Comment, A New Con-
cept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange-A Comment on In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 15.
S.C.L. REV. 557 (1963).




Wright stock. 2 The sell orders were executed before the news of
the board's action reached the Exchange."3 In the subsequent disci-
plinary proceeding instituted by the Commission,7 ' the SEC deter-
mined that Gintel and Cady had willfully violated rule 10b-5 by
failing to disclose the dividend reduction prior to trading.76 The
Commission established a two-pronged test:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose] rests on two principal
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, di-
rectly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of any-
one, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing.7'
Cady, Roberts involved several questions of "signal impor-
tance" 77 and marked a significant departure from common-law
principles of securities fraud. 8 Under the SEC's "access test," any
person enjoying any access-yielding relationship with an issuer of
securities could be charged with the "correlative responsibilities"
7, Id. at 911.
73 Id. at 909.
7' The respondents were charged with willful violations of rule lOb-5 and section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). 40 S.E.C. at 908.
75 40 S.E.C. at 911. The Curtiss-Wright director who "tipped" the news of the dividend
cut to Gintel died in 1960, and was not, therefore, a party to the proceeding. Id. at 909 n.4.
The SEC rejected the respondents' contention that they were under no duty of disclo-
sure because the sales of Curtiss-Wright stock were effected on a national securities ex-
change. Id. at 914. The Commission concluded that while a lack of privity may preclude
recovery in private suits against insiders, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309
F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), af'd in part, reu'd in 'Part, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affld per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), it did not relieve the
insider of his obligation to disclose under rule lob-5. 40 S.E.C. at 914-15. Since securities
exchanges were the "primary markets for securities," the Commission stated, it would be
anomalous if exchange transactions were insulated from the antifraud provisions of the se-
curities acts. Id. at 914.
' 40 S.E.C. at 912. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). In Schoenbaum, it was held that both elements of
the Cady, Roberts test are necessary before a lob-5 violation for nondisclosure will arise.
The mere buying on inside information, absent inherent unfairness, does not automatically
result in a violation of the rule. 268 F. Supp. at 395.
7 40 S.E.C. at 907.
7' See id. at 913-14; H. MANNE, INsIDER TRAmDING AND THE STOCK MARKET 39 (1966). But
see 75 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1450 (1962). Chairman Cary, writing for the Commission, ex-
pressly stated that it is inappropriate to confuse the antifraud provisions in the securities
acts with the common-law notions of fiduciary relationship. Id.; see note 79 infra.
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of an insider, even if that relationship did not fall within tradi-
tional "insider" categories.79 Furthermore, although the district
court in Speed had previously alluded to the "unfairness" element
in nondisclosure liability,80 Cady, Roberts was the first decision to
recognize expressly that the disclosure obligation created by rule
10b-5 was in part attributable to inherent unfairness.81 Since the
courts preferred to define the limits of 10b-5's duty of disclosure
on a case-by-case basis, 2 the Cady, Roberts test won quick judicial
approval.83
The philosophy of market egalitarianism spawned in Cady,
Roberts culminated in 1968 with the landmark decision by the
71 See 40 S.E.C. at 911. The Commission declared that the affirmative duty to disclose
material nonpublic information was not limited to corporate insiders. Id.; see Bromberg,
Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 740
(1968). Under an access standard, therefore, the Cady, Roberts respondents were subject to
a duty of disclosure even though they were not traditional insiders of the corporation from
which the nonpublic information was generated. 40 S.E.C. at 912. Cf. James Blackstone
Mem. Library Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 264 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 815 (1959) (majority shareholder has duty to disclose material information under rule
10b-5); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (officer-director has duty of disclosure under rule 10b-5); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (controlling shareholder has duty of
disclosure under rule 10b-5). The respondents in Cady, Roberts were actually "tippees" of
an insider. See 6 L. Loss, supra note 44, at 3561.
80 See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
8I See 40 S.E.C. at 912. The unfairness element stems from the unique informational
advantage which an insider possesses when dealing with "outsiders." Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAv. L.
REy. 322, 346 (1979); Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of Law, 1967 Wisc. L.
REV. 720, 720-21. Brudney describes the unfairness in the insider's informational advantage
as
a function [not] merely of possessing more information - outsiders may possess
more information than other outsiders by reason of their diligence and zeal - but
of the fact that it is an advantage which cannot be competed away since it de-
pends upon a lawful privilege to which an outsider cannot acquire access.
Brudney, supra at 346. Although the unfairness test had been implicit in the prohibitions
against insider trading for some time, see, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. at
829; In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 380-81 (1943), Cady, Roberts was the
first to articulate it. See 40 S.E.C. at 812.
82 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963). The SEC has been accused of favoring this ad hoc approach by
the judiciary, since the Commission has been considerably influential in the fixing of guide-
lines to rule 10b-5 by the courts. See H. MANNE, supra note 78, at viii.
83 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
RULE 10b-5
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co." In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company (TGS) conducted aerial geophysical explora-
tions, led by a TGS vice president, in eastern Canada in March of
1959.85 Based on the results of the initial aerial surveys,88 ground
explorations were begun in late October 196387 and, by November
12 of that year, drilling samples had indicated extensive minerali-
zation."' When this information was relayed to TGS's president, he
ordered that the results of the drillings be kept secret, even from
other TGS employees, officers, and directors.8 " Rumors began to
circulate, however, that TGS had discovered a rich mineral de-
posit, and on April 11, 1964, unauthorized reports of its drilling
activities appeared in two American newspapers.90 Although its ex-
plorations indicated that a commercially mineable copper deposit
had been found,91 TGS issued a press release on April 12, stating
that the rumors were exaggerated and that the drillings had been
inconclusive.2 Four days later, TGS announced the discovery of at
least 25 million tons of copper ore.93
- 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see Brom-
berg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731,
736 (1968). For a sampling of the commentary in the law reviews surrounding the Texas
Gulf Sulphur litigation, see Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Prac-
tices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965);
Leavell, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Opinion in the Appellate Court: An Open Door to Federal
Control of Corporations, 3 GA. L. REv. 141 (1968); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur - The Sec-
ond Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 423 (1968); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 425 (1969).
85 401 F.2d at 843. In addition to the TGS vice president, the aerial survey team was
comprised of three TGS employees. Id.
" Id. The aerial surveys indicated unusual variations in the electrical conductivity of
the rock beneath the surface, suggesting the presence of commercial sulphide deposits. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), reu'd in part, aff'd in
part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
'6 The commencement of the on-ground explorations was delayed until TGS could ac-
quire rights to the land around the "anomalies" discovered in the aerial survey. 258 F. Supp.
at 270.
Is 401 F.2d at 843. By visual inspection, a significant concentration of copper and zinc
appeared to be present in the sample. Id. These concentrations were verified in a subse-
quent chemical assay. Id.
I Id. at 843.
to Id. at 844.
91 Id. at 862 n.28. Four experts would testify before the district court that they had
never heard of a "comparable initial exploratory drill hole in a base metal deposit." Id.
"2 Id. at 845.
Is Id. at 846.
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The SEC subsequently brought an action to enjoin TGS and
the individual defendants, including two TGS directors and ten
other TGS officers and employees, from violating section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5." Since each of the individual defendants in Texas Gulf
Sulphur was an "insider" in the traditional sense,95 liability for
nondisclosure could have been established under the Cady, Rob-
erts access test.98 Instead of applying an access standard, however,
the Second Circuit found that the defendants had violated rule
10b-5 under a new standard, holding that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the securities concerned while such information remains
undisclosed.97
With the shift in focus in Texas Gulf Sulphur from access to
possession, it appeared that the "unfairness" element in securities
fraud liability had become paramount. In fact, after the district
4 Id. at 852. Eleven of the individual defendants were charged with having violated
rule 10b-5 by purchasing TGS stock or calls thereon between November 12, 1963 and April
16, 1964. 258 F. Supp. at 281. Three of the individual defendants were charged with having
violated the rule by tipping material nonpublic information. 401 F.2d at 839-41. The SEC
complaint also charged that five of the individual defendants had accepted options to buy
TGS stock on February 20, 1964 without disclosing material information known to them
about the results of the exploratory drilling in contravention of the statute and the rule. Id.
at 839-42.
In addition to seeking injunctive relief, the SEC sought rescission of the securities
transactions of the individual defendants if they were found to have been conducted in
violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 839.
" See note 7 supra.
"See note 76 and accompanying text supra. The district court in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
applying the Cady, Roberts rationale, held that employers "who are in possession of mate-
rial undisclosed information obtained in the course of their employment" are subject to the
disclosure obligation of rule 10b-5. 258 F. Supp. at 279. This was the first time that rule
10b-5 was held to impose an affirmative duty to disclose on employees. See Note, Texas
Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Its Implications, 22 VAND. L. Rv. 359, 366 (1969).
401 F.2d at 849. It is not clear why the Texas Gulf Sulphur court chose to move to
the more liberal "possession" test. It appears that the court was anticipating the question of
whether "tippees" could be held liable for fraudulent nondisclosure under rule 10b-5, ac-
cord, Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), since
the access test could be unavailing where the defendant, a noninsider, trades on second-
hand, or even more remote information, Bromberg, supra note 79, at 740, 747-49. The Texas
Gulf Sulphur court, in fact, did declare that the conduct of the defendant's "tippees" was as
"equally reprehensible" to that of the "tippers," 401 F.2d at 852-53, but since none of the
tippees had been named as defendants, the court was not presented with the issue of
whether trading by tippees on material inside information would violate rule 10b-5, id.
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court decision in that case, one commentator noted that rule 10b-5
had been construed "so loosely that it is closer to unfairness than
to what either lawyers or laymen usually think of as fraud."98 It
seemed, moreover, that the courts might be more receptive to ex-
tending 10b-5 liability for nondisclosure to "outsiders" under the
"possession" standard.99 Indeed, shortly after Texas Gulf Sulphur,
" 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at § 1.1, quoted in SEC v. Great Amer. Indus., Inc.,
407 F.2d 453, 462 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969). The Texas Gulf Sulphur court's emphasis on the unfairness element was further
evinced by its conclusion on when information becomes material. Rejecting the district
court's "conservative" test for materiality, the court held that: "The basic test of materiality
... is whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to the information) in determin-
ing his choice of action in the transaction in question." 401 F.2d at 849 (quoting List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1964)). The
court's determination that information need not be "reasonably certain to have a substan-
tial effect on the market price" to be material is of extreme significance, see 401 F.2d at 849,
because as one commentator has stated: "Materiality is probably the most important ele-
ment a plaintiff must plead and prove in a misrepresentation or nondisclosure case." Brom-
berg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-52, in Proceedings ABA National Institute, Revolution
in Securities Regulation, 29 Bus. LAw. 167 (Spec. Issue 1974). See generally Wiesen, Dis-
closure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. R.v. 189
(1968).
The trend toward liberalizing the definition of materiality was continued by the Su-
preme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), wherein the
Court stated that facts are material if "a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of [his] decision." 406 U.S. at 153-54. It is unclear, however, if the
liberal standard of materiality enunciated in Affiliated Ute Citizens remains viable in light
of the Court's subsequent decision in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976). See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 3, § 61.02[b][i] at 3-91 to 3-92. In TSC, the Court
defined the standard of materiality under rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act, stating that "[a]n
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in [reaching his decision]." 426 U.S. at 449. Courts after TSC
have applied its materiality standard in 10b-5 cases. See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594
F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978).
"In SEC v. Great Amer. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. de-
nied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), decided by the Second Circuit four months after Texas Gulf
Sulphur, Judge Friendly, author of the majority opinion, stated that it "would be occupying
new ground and would require most careful consideration" before the disclosure obligation
of rule 10b-5 should be read as applying to persons other than insiders. 407 F.2d at 460.
Judge Kaufman, concurring separately, however, stated that
any claim that material facts were withheld in a transaction in connection with
the sale or purchase of securities must be scrutinized with care, whether or not
there would have been liability at common law for such a deed.
407 F.2d at 463 (Kaufman, J., concurring). The possession test announced in Texas Gulf
Sulphur 'was reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dynamics Inc. v. Gold-
muntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972); Bruce v. Rosenberg, 463 F. Supp. 673, 675 (E.D.
Wis. 1979); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Pa. 1969). But cf.
Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lob-5
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a court for the first time held that "tippees" in possession of mate-
rial inside information with the knowledge that is not available to
the public generally, must either disclose the information or refrain
from trading.100 Until Chiarella, however, it was unclear to what
extent the federal securities laws did in fact create a more far-
reaching disclosure obligation than existed at common law.
NARROWING THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE: CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATES
In Chiarella v. United States, the defendant, a financial
printer, learned of several pending takeover bids while preparing
documents for the acquiring corporations. 01 Without disclosing his
knowledge of the forthcoming takeovers, Chiarella purchased stock
in each of the prospective target companies and then promptly
sold the shares at a significant profit when the tender offers were
made public.0 2 Chiarella's trading activity eventually became the
subject of an SEC investigation and, in 1977, Chiarella entered
Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rav. 423, 439 n.88 (1968) (Texas Gulf Sulphur
"most probably" did not intend possession test); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings
and Implications, 22 VAND. L. Rav. 359, 377 (1969) (Texas Gulf Sulphur did not alter basic
definition of "insider").
110 SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
1974). Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), is sometimes cited as the first court
decision to impose an affirmative duty to disclose on a "tippee." The tippee in Ross was
actually an employee, however, and the Ross court prefaced its holding primarily on the
district court decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, wherein the court held that employees are
insiders under the Cady, Roberts test. 263 F. Supp. at 408.
The SEC, a year before Shapiro, held that the tippee who has "reason to know" that
the information he possesses emanates from a source within the issuer is subject to the
disclosure obligation imposed by rule 10b-5. See In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633,
644 (1971). See generally Comment, Investors Management Company and Rule lOb-5 -
The Tippee at Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 545 (1972); Note, Investors Management: Institu-
tional Investors as Tippees, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 502 (1971).
01 445 U.S. at 224.
102 Id. The information Chiarella employed was "market" information in that it was
"generated by sources outside the company whose shares [were] affected." Fleisher, Mund-
heir & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Informa-
tion, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 807 (1973); see ALI, FEDERAL SECURITMS CODE § 1603, rev.
comment 2(j), at 531 (Proposed Official Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as ALI PROPOSED
CODE]. Although no person had previously been held liable, either civilly or criminally, for
trading on nonpublic market information, see United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1373
(Meskill, J., dissenting), the SEC had obtained consent judgments from other printers in
factual situations similar to those present in Chiarella, see, e.g., SEC v. Manderano, [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 96,357 (D.N.J. 1978); SEC v. Primar Typo-
graphers, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,734 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1
95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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into a consent decree in which he agreed to relinquish his profits0 s
to the sellers of the target company stock. 04 He subsequently was
indicted and convicted of the willful misuse of material nonpublic
information in violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.10 5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
Chiarella's argument that he was not subject to the disclosure obli-
gation of an insider 0 6 and affirmed his conviction, 07 holding that
the "disclose or refrain from trading" rule enunciated in Texas
Gulf Sulphur applied to "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-
who regularly receives material nonpublic information."'' 08
103 Disgorgement of profits is one form of ancillary relief sought by the SEC in injunc-
tion proceedings under section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). See
generally Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches
of Rule 10b-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 397, 398-417 (1979).
104 445 U.S. at 224.
105 Id. at 225.
106 588 F.2d at 1364. Chiarella argued that he did not breach any duty of disclosure
since he was neither "an 'insider' or a 'tippee' of an 'insider' of the target corporations
whose shares he purchased." Brief for Petitioner at 24, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In support of
his argument, he pointed to the Second Circuit's decision in General Time Corp. v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). Brief for Peti-
tioner at 25-26, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Holding that a tender offeror did not breach rule 10b-5
by purchasing shares of the target company stock without revealing his true intentions, the
Second Circuit stated: "We know of no rule of law ... that a purchaser of stock, who was
not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to
reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale." 403 F.2d
at 164. Talley Industries implied, therefore, that although material lies and half-truths
would serve as a basis for violation of rule 10b-5, see L. Loss, supra note 44, at 1445, pure
nondisclosure of outside information would not, since there is nothing to trigger an obliga-
tion to divulge such information.
107 588 F.2d at 1373. Chiarella was convicted under section 32(a) of the Exchange Act
which imposes criminal liability on "[a]ny person who willfully violates any provision of [the
Exchange Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976). Since no person, not even a corporate insider, had ever
been held to have violated rule 10b-5 by trading on material nonpublic information which
emanated from a source outside the issuer, Chiarella argued that his conviction deprived
him of the fair notice requirement of the due process clause. 588 F.2d at 1369. The Second
Circuit rejected this argument since other printers ;who had engaged in conduct identical to
Chiarella's had previously consented to preliminary injunctions against them. Id. at 1369 &
n.17. See note 102 supra. Moreover, Chiarella's employer had posted numerous signs
throughout his plant, warning employees that criminal liability could result from their per-
sonal use of confidential information learned by them in the course of their employment.
588 F.2d at 1369 & n.18. For a comprehensive discussion of the due process question
presented in Chiarella, see Deutsch, The New Deal and the Burger Court: The Significance
of United States v. Chiarella, 57 Tax. L. Rav. 965 (1979).
1" 588 F.2d at 1365. The Second Circuit found that Chiarella was a "market insider"
because his position as a financial printer gave him "access on a regular basis to the most
confidential information in the world of finance." Id. As support for extending 10b-5's dis-
closure obligation to "market insiders," the court pointed to the concept of "quasi-insiders"
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On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the Second
Circuit's "regular access" test 1 9 and reversed Chiarella's convic-
tion.110 Relying primarily on the SEC's decision in Cady, Rob-
erts,"' the Court concluded that prior SEC and lower court deci-
sions had recognized an affirmative disclosure obligation under rule
10b-5 where "a relationship of trust and confidence [existed] be-
tween parties to a transaction."11 2 The Court held, therefore, that
"a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of non-public market information."1 3 Since Chiarella
was neither an insider of the issuer nor a fiduciary to the selling
developed in the American Law Institute's proposed codification of the federal securities
laws, see ALI PROPOSED CODE, supra note 102, § 1603, comment 3(d). 588 F.2d at 1365-66.
Under the ALI code, quasi-insiders would be subject to a duty of disclosure in "egregious"
cases. See ALI PROPOSED CODE, supra note 102, § 1603, comment 3(d). The Second Circuit
believed Chiarella's conduct to be "sufficiently egregious" to give rise to a duty of disclosure
under the ALI approach. 588 F.2d at 1366.
The court also drew support for its position by analogizing Chiarella's status as a "mar-
ket insider" to the status of the two defendant bank employees in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See 588 F.2d at 1366. In Affiliated Ute Citizens, a cor-
poration was formed to manage the assets of the mixed-blood members of the Ute Indian
Tribe. 406 U.S. at 136. Shares of capital stock were issued to each mixed-blood member, but
deposited with a bank as transfer agent for the stock. Id. at 136-37. In order to sell their
shares, therefore, the mixed-bloods had to deal through the bank. Id. at 145. Two assistant
managers of the bank, while performing the functions of transfer agent, personally pur-
chased shares without disclosing to the selling Indians that they were actively soliciting or-
ders for the shares for the purpose of resale at a higher price. Id. at 146-48. The Supreme
Court held that had the two employees merely acted as transfer agents, they would not have
been subject to a duty of disclosure. Id. at 151-52. But, by additionally acting as "market
markers," the Court concluded that the two employees had violated rule 10b-5 by failing to
disclose that they were in a position to profit by reselling the shares at a higher price. Id. at
153.
' 445 U.S. at 231-32.
110 Id. at 237.
" See notes 69-76 and accompanying text supra. The Court interpreted Cady, Roberts
narrowly as recognizing "a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of
a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of
their position with that corporation." 445 U.S. at 228.
112 445 U.S. at 230. The Court also r~ied on its prior decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), 445 U.S. at 229-30; see note 108 supra, but unlike the
Second Circuit, the Chiarella Court perceived the disclosure obligation of the defendant
bank employees as arising from the trust and confidence reposed in them by the mixed-
blood members of the Ute tribe. See 445 U.S. at 230.
113 Id. at 235. In rejecting the Second Circuit's regular access test, the Chiarella Court
pointed out that "not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under § 10(b)." Id. at 232. Thus, the Court put a damper on the trend toward making the
unfairness element the predominant factor underlying the 10b-5 disclosure obligation, see
note 98 and accompanying text supra, as evidenced by its statement: "INleither the Con-
gress nor the Commission has ever adopted a parity-of-information rule." 445 U.S. at 233.
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shareholders, he had no obligation to reveal his knowledge of the
impending takeovers and, thus, his silence was not violative of sec-
tion 10(b). n '
By adopting this special relationship standard, the Court in
Chiarella rejected the trend in the lower federal courts expanding
rule 10b-5's duty of disclosure far beyond common-law parameters.
Relying instead on the SEC's twenty-year-old decision in Cady,
Roberts, the Court effectively ignored two decades of precedent
construing the disclosure obligation under section 10(b).11 5 The
"earthshaking" decision of Texas Gulf Sulphur, which established
the possession test for nondisclosure liability, was mentioned by
the Court only as an example of "corporate insiders us[ing] undis-
closed information for their own benefit."11 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Court found the Second Circuit's "regular re-
ceipt" test to be a "radical departure" from the special relationship
standard which it announced.1'
It appears, moreover, that the Chiarella Court's reading of
Cady, Roberts was unduly narrow. The respondents in Cady, Rob-
erts were not held to a duty to disclose because of their special
relationship to the buyers of Curtiss-Wright stock, but rather be-
cause they shared the responsibilities of insiders by virtue of their
access to inside information.'1 The Commission in Cady, Roberts
was also quick to point out that the "antifraud provisions are not
intended as a specification of [what] constitute[s] fraud, but rather
are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which
undue advantage may be taken of investors."11 9 It is submitted
114 445 U.S. at 232-33.
,,5 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Chiarella, observed that the majority's special
relationship test placed the federal securities laws in the "rearguard" of the modem com-
mon-law trend "toward a more flexible, less formalistic understaniling of the duty to dis-
close." 445 U.S. at 247-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was also highly criti-
cal of the majority's restrictive interpretation of section 10(b), stating:
The Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent decisions
designed to transform § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic "catchall" provision to
one that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes in-
vestment in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor.
445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
116 445 U.S. at 229.
117 See id. at 233.
118 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); note 111 supra.
1' 40 S.E.C. at 911. Professor Cary, commenting later on the Cady, Roberts decision,
stated that it would be an "illusory quest" to ask the SEC to define fraud. Symposium,
Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1012 (1966); cf. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
1980]
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that the Chiarella Court overlooked this aspect of Cady, Roberts
when it observed that the description of section 10(b) as a "catch-
all" does not alter the fact that "what it catches must be fraud. '120
Regardless of the merit of the Supreme Court's special rela-
tionship test,121 Chiarella may impede the effective enforcement of
rule 10b-5 antifraud provisions in two significant ways.122 By im-
posing a duty only when there exists a relation of trust and confi-
dence between buyer and seller, Chiarella has restricted the poten-
tial defendants as to whom mere silence is actionable under the
rule.123 Furthermore, the Supreme Court also may have weakened
the power of the SEC to combat insider trading on the national
securities markets. 124 If, as suggested by the Court, however, 10b-5
may be breached by trading on the basis of converted, nonpublic
information,1 25 then the impediments raised by the Court's special
375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) (10b-5 prohibitions against fraud apply "whether the arti-
fices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of
deception").
120 445 U.S. at 234-35.
121 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan agreed with the Chiarella majority that
the mere possession of nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose, but
both believed that a relationship of trust and confidence between buyer and seller was not
necessary to establish a duty of disclosure. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring), 243 n.4
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122 Except for the intent and burden of proof issues, civil and criminal liability for
breach of section 10(b) and rule lob-5 are "coextensive." See United States v. Charnay, 537
F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); 5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 3,
§ 263, at 11-289. Thus, although Chiarella was a criminal case, its implications for 10b-5's
affirmatve duty of disclosure are applicable to SEC actions for injunctive relief and for
private actions for damages.
123 Certainly, under the special relationship standard of Chiarella, the protection of
10b-5 is unavailable in any pure nondisclosure case involving transactions by an outsider
over a national securities exchange. Moreover, as Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent,
see 445 U.S. at 246 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), if the special relationship between the
parties must be establisHed directly, it will be difficult to establish a breach of rule 10b-5 by
tippees trading on material inside information. The Chiarella Court's reliance on Cady,
Roberts, however, in which the respondents were actually tippees, implies that the requisite
relationship of trust and confidence can be satisfied derivatively through a fiduciary or an
officer or director of the issuer. The SEC has espoused this view subsequent to Chiarella.
See SEC v. Lerner, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,334 (D.D.C.
1980); Marcus, Tax Shelter, Insider Suits Filed Against Law Firms, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 14,
1980, at 2, col. 3. The remote tippee who trades on material inside information may, there-
fore, still be subject to SEC sanctions and answerable in damages to private investors as
well.
124 See notes 130-134 and accompanying text infra.
1 5 See 445 U.S. at 235-36. Four of the Justices in Chiarella expressed the belief that
Chiarella, by trading on misappropriated information, had violated rule 10b-5 by breaching
a duty of silence owed to the owner of the information. See 445 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 245 (Blackmun & Marshall J.J., dis-
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relationship test will be substantially mitigated.1 2 6 What follows is
an analysis of this conversion theory of liability and an examina-
tion of the impact of Chiarella on the implied right of action under
section 10(b) and on the enforcement powers of the SEC.
Trading on Misappropriated Nonpublic Information
The Supreme Court declined to rule on an alternative theory
of liability, based on the unauthorized use of misappropriated in-
fornation, that may ameliorate somewhat the restrictive rule of
Chiarella.127 The rationale of this conversion theory is that
Chiarella breached a duty of silence owed to the acquiring corpora-
tions when he converted confidential information obtained in the
course of his work as a printer.128 The Second Circuit had reasoned
that this fraud on the customers of Chiarella's employer was "in
connection with the purchase or sale" of securities and, therefore,
violated rule 10b-5.129 The conversion theory is fraught with theo-
retical and practical difficulties, however, and is not entirely con-
sistent with 10b-5 precedent.
First, while the conversion theory may create some basis for
imposing liability on wrongdoing "outsiders," it provides no rem-
edy in situations where a noninsider trades on material nonpublic
information that has been obtained legally. For example, large in-
stitutional investors commonly trade for their customers' accounts
on the basis of information that another institutional investor is
planning to purchase or sell a large block of securities.130 Although
senting). The Court did not decide, however, whether Chiarella had breached rule 1Ob-5 by
trading on misappropriated information since this theory was never submitted to the jury.
Id. at 236. The SEC, subsequent to Chiarella, has indicated that it will proceed with its
enforcement program to deter insider trading under this misappropriation theory. Green-
house, Supreme Court Rules for Printer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1980, 'at D1, col. 3, D18, col.
1.
126 See Top Court Limits View Involving 'Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1980,
at 12, col. 3.
it See note 125 supra.
128 Chief Justice Burger, the leading exponent for the Court on the misappropriation
theory, perceived the conversion of nonpublic information as giving rise to a duty of disclo-
sure, rather than a duty of silence. See 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see id.
at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). If the duty is one of disclosure, however, the question arises
as to whom the duty is owed - to the owner of the information or to investors generally?
Chief Justice Burger's dissent is silent on this point.
'29 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1368 n.14.
130 Securities trading by institutional investors is of startling dimension. According to
the SEC, institutional investors purchased $56.7 billion and sold $46.5 billion of common
stock in 1979 [Current Transfer Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 554, at A-18 (May
1980]
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the informational advantage of the institutional investor may be
unfair, and its trading may not be justified by any legitimate busi-
ness purpose, it will not be liable for nondisclosure under rule 10b-
5 on a conversion theory. Moreover, there is no disclosure obliga-
tion under Chiarella's special relationship test and, hence, such
conduct would not result in a breach of the rule.'
Additionally, a conversion theory of liability is inconsistent
with decisions imposing liability on outsiders for misuse of market
information despite the absence of a conversion. In the typical
"scalping" case,13 2 for instance, a financial columnist publishes a
favorable report on a security and recommends its purchase with-
out disclosing his recent prior purchases of the security. After pub-
lication of his report precipitates a rise in the price of the security,
he sells his shares at a profit.2s Prior to Chiarella, this activity had
been held violative of rule lOb-5.3' After Chiarella, however, it is
unclear whether such activity could result in a breach of the rule,
since the columnist is neither an insider, nor a fiduciary of those
from whom he purchased. Furthermore, no misappropriated infor-
mation is involved in the transaction.
Finally, a conversion theory of liability under rule 10b-5 would
21, 1980). Moreover, indications are that the volume of trading by institutional investors is
on the increase. See [Current Transfer Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 567, at A-11
(Aug. 20, 1980).
'31 See Brodsky, Trading on Inside Market Information, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 3, 1980, at 1,
col. 1, & 2, col. 3.
132 Scalping has been defined as "the purchase of securities by a person in a position to
influence others by his recommendation or favorable commentary on that security, the rec-
ommendation of that security to investors, and the sale of that security after capital appre-
ciation." Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press: A New Dimension to Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 80, 81 (1969); see, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
'33 See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); cf. SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (scalping by investment advisor).
134 E.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1969). In Zweig, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that scalping by a financial columnist "violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 just
as corporate insiders do when they withhold material facts about a corporation's prospects
while trading in its stock." Id. at 1267 (citing the Second Circuit's decision in United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978)). The Zweig court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963),
wherein the Court held that scalping by an investment advisor constituted a violation of
section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). 375 U.S. at
183. As pointed out by one commentator, however, unlike the investment advisor, a financial
columnist is not a fiduciary. See Peskind, supra note 132, at 85-86. See generally Note, A
Financial Columnist's Duty to the Market Under Rule 10b-5: Civil Damages For Trading
on a Misleading Investment Recommendation, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1021 (1980).
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institutionalize the distinction between "inside" information de-
rived from the issuer and "outside" information generated by
sources outside the issuer. In practice and effect, this is a distinc-
tion without a difference. 135 As the Second Circuit in Chiarella
noted, "From the point of view of a shareholder who sells his stock
on the day before the price jumps sharply upward, it matters little
whether the cause of the rise wvas news of an ore strike . . . or, as
here, the announcement of a tender offer. ' 136 The Supreme Court's
approach, however, has forced such artificial distinctions.
The Effect of Chiarella on the Private Right of Action and on the
SEC's Enforcement Powers
The pre-Chiarella trend in the lower courts toward expansion
of 10b-5's disclosure obligation coincided with a relaxation of the
causation element of the nondisclosure cause of action. Pure non-
disclosure of material nonpublic information had only recently
been recognized as a basis for civil liability for damages.37 Histori-
135 The American Law Institue has emphatically stated that there is no basis for distin-
guishing between "inside" and "market" information:
So far as an "insider's" use of market information is concerned, there is no
reason in either principle or the case law to distinguish... between material in-
formation that is intrinsic to the company... and market information that will
not affect the company's assets or earning power ....
ALI PROPOSED CODE, supra note 102, § 1603, comment 2(j). See Peloso, SEC Rule 10b-5 and
Outside Information, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1972, at 32, col. 3.
136 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365 n.8.
137 Although there had been dicta to the effect that pure nondisclosure could give rise
to a private action for damages, see List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), all of the pre-1969 cases which recognized a private
cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure involved either a face-to-face transaction or
some element of misrepresentation. See, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962)(manipulative activity conducted by defendants); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951)(written offer made by defendants omitting critical
facts); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1947)(express misrepresentations made by defendants). The first decision to
recognize pure silence as a basis for a private action for damages was Astor v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), one of the more than one hundred civil
actions seeking damages from the Texas Gulf Sulphur company for issuing the misleading
press release and from the individual defendants for trading on inside information, see
Ruder, supra note 99, at n.25. The Astor plaintiffs were primarily former shareholders in
TGS who sold shares or calls on TGS stock between November 12, 1963 and April 12, 1964,
the date the misleading press release was issued. Id. at 1337. They brought suit against
many of the same defendants named in the enforcement action brought by the SEC, see
note 94 and accompanying text supra, alleging that they would not have sold had they
known of the material information which the defendants failed to disclose. 306 F. Supp. at
1337. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that no private action
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cally, actionable nondisclosure could be established in a private
suit for damages, as distinguished from an SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding, only upon affirmative proof that the plaintiff's injury was
caused by the defendant's conduct.138 Obviously, where the defen-
dant's unlawful transactions were effected on a national securities
exchange, the plaintiff could not establish that he was in privity 89
with the defendant, nor could he establish literal reliance on the
defendant's conduct.1 40 With the acknowledgement by the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court of the rule 10b-5 purpose to "insure fairness in
securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face,
over the counter, or on the exchanges, '141 it was finally established
for damages was stated on these facts. Id. at 1339. The court denied the motion, holding
that the plaintiffs would be entitled to damages if they could show that they would have
acted differently if the undisclosed material information had been made known to them at
the time they sold their shares. Id. at 1341-42. But see Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), affd sub nor. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). Just as in Astor, one of the plaintiffs
in Reynolds had sold his stock in TGS through a national securities exchange four months
prior to the misleading press release of April 12, 1964, but after the discovery of the initial
core. 309 F. Supp. at 554. Although the trial court stated that privity is not a prerequisite to
recovery for violations of rule 10b-5, it held that nondisclosure in violation of the rule will
not give rise to liability unless there is some form of manipulation involved which causes the
plaintiff's damage. Id. Under this test, the court found that the plaintiff's damage had not
been caused by the defendants' violation of the rule. Id. at 555.
3 See generally Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 1OB-5: A Sugges-
tion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 674-82 (1965).
3"9 The seminal decisions under rule 10b-5 had required some semblance of privity be-
tween the buyer and the seller to establish causation in a nondisclosure case. See, e.g., Mei-
sel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor,
136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). See generally 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 3, § 62; 3 L. Loss, supra note 44, at 1767-71. Although the requirement
of privity in a private action for damages under rule 10b-5 has been criticized, see, e.g., 3 L.
Loss, supra note 44, at 1468; 63 COLUM. L. REV. 934, 941 (1963), at least one commentator
has argued that the privity requirement is necessary to prevent liability for violation of rule
10b-5 from becoming open-ended. See Ruder, supra note 99, at 446.
1 Although some courts recognized that the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's con-
duct would be sufficient to establish causation where some element of misrepresentation or
manipulation was involved, see, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759-61 (5th Cir.
1974); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1962); Reynolds
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 560 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Cochran
v. Charming Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), this was of little solace to
plaintiffs in pure nondisclosure cases. See Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp.
548 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); see note 137 supra.
141 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353
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that "causation in fact" could be proved-even in the absence of
privity or proof of reliance-if the undisclosed information was
material.142 "All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be ma-
terial in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
them important.' 1 43 Consequently, with the causation requirement
relaxed considerably, the plaintiff's cause of action for violation of
rule 10b-5 was stated by a mere showing that the defendant, with
scienter14 and prior to trading, failed to disclose material inside
information which he knew was not publicly available, and that the
plaintiff's trading was contemporaneous with that of the
defendant. 145
F. Supp. 264, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aft'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961).
," See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974). But see
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
l' Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
144 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-05 (1976). See generally Bucklo, The
Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977).
M See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d
Cir. 1974). But see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977). Shapiro is representative of the evolution that has occurred in civil liability for
trading on material nonpublic information. It seems that Merrill Lynch, by virtue of its
position as prospective managing underwriter for Douglas Aircraft Company, learned that
Douglas' earnings for the first five months of its fiscal year were lower than had previously
been expected. 495 F.2d at 232. Before this information was publicly disclosed, certain of-
ficers, directors and employees of Merrill Lynch leaked the news of Douglas' adverse earn-
ings report to several of its customers. Id. Although the "tippees" knew or should have
known that the information was not yet public, they nevertheless sold several thousand
shares of Douglas stock through the New York Stock Exchange. Id. The Shapiro plaintiffs,
who purchased their shares of Douglas stock during the same time period in which the tip-
pees sold, id. at 232-33, brought suit against Merrill Lynch and several of its officers, em-
ployees, and directors for tipping material inside information, and against the Merrill Lynch
customers for selling Douglas stock while in possession of material nonpublic information
which had been leaked to them by Merrill Lynch. None of the Shapiro defendants was an
insider in the traditional sense, see note 7 and accompanying text supra; nor did the alleged
fraudulent activity involve any element of manipulation, misrepresentation, or omission, see
note 137 supra; nor was there any semblance of privity between the parties, see note 139
supra; and since the defendants sold on a national securities exchange, there was no actual
reliance by the plaintiffs on the defendants' activity, see note 140 supra. Moreover, there
was no showing that the shares purchased by the plaintiffs were the same specific shares
sold by the defendants. 495 F.2d at 233. Although each of the foregoing elements had been
held at one time to be sufficient to defeat a cause of action for damages, the Second Circuit
held, on the basis of the Texas Gulf Sulphur and Affiliated Ute decisions, that the defen-
dants would be liable in damages for violating rule 10b-5 should the plaintiffs succeed at
trial in proving the facts alleged in their complaint. Id. at 241.
Fridrich, like Shapiro, was another action for damages based on pure nondisclosure,
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It is submitted that the Chiarella Court, in recognition of the
enormous liability which could result from trading on material
nonpublic information, was actually attempting to retard further
expansion of civil liability under rule 10b-5.146 While the Court's
wherein the defendants, using material nonpublic information, purchased shares in an im-
personal market. 542 F.2d at 313. It was also "undisputed" that the plaintiffs had not sold
their shares to the defendants. Id. Although the district court held that the defendants were
liable in damages for violating rule 10b-5, id. at 312-13, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding
that the defendants' conduct did not cause the plaintiffs' injury. Id. at 318. In reaching its
conclusion, the Sixth Circuit expressly refused to follow the Second Circuit's rationale in
Shapiro, id., and held that the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute, see text accom-
panying notes 141-142 supra, was limited to its "circumstances," since Affiliated Ute in-
volved a scheme to defraud as well as nondisclosure. 542 F.2d at 319-20. See generally
Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under Rule 10b-5,
38 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 (1977); Comment, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading
on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 299 (1974).
46 Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (absent any misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure, mere breach of fiduciary duty by majority shareholders does not con-
stitute violation of rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (absent
some allegation of scienter, no civil cause of action for money damages will lie under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (offeree
who was neither purchaser nor seller has no standing to maintain cause of action for money
damages for violation of rule 10b-5). Although indications are that Congress never intended
the implied private right of action under section 10(b), Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 643 (1963); DeLancey,
Rule 10b-5-A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1355 (1970), such a right is firmly estab-
lished. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). In recognizing that this right has been implied by the lower
courts, the Supreme Court has not been insensitive to the substantial civil liability which
may result from violation of the rule. In fact, its decisions in Hochfelder, Santa Fe, and
Blue Chip Stamps may be read fairly as attempts to curtail the private right of action for
violation of rule 10b-5. See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 G.o. L.J. 891, 892, 900-01 & n.57 (1977); Whita-
ker & Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30
ALA. L. Rav. 335, 393 (1979).
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court severely restricted the class of plaintiffs who may sue
for damages for violation of rule 10b-5 to actual purchasers or sellers of securities. Blue
Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 731. Thus, the Court held that an offeree
who was discouraged from purchasing securities by an overly pessimistic prospectus had no
standing to maintain an action against the issuer for money damages under the rule. Id. at
727. Similarly, in Santa Fe, the Court held that in the absence of any misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, minority shareholders had no cause of action under 10b-5 for injury resulting
from the majority shareholders' breach of fiduciary duty. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. at 471-72. Thus, Santa Fe further restricted the private cause of action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 to those plaintiffs whose cause of action was based, not on fraud gener-
ally, but on some material misrepresentation or failure to disclose. See Lowenfels, supra, at
900-01 n.57. It is submitted that the Court's decision in Chiarella is still another attempt by
the Court to restrict the class of plaintiffs who may sue for violation of rule 10b-5. In his
concurrence in Blue Chip Stamps, Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion in
Chiarella, noted that allowing offerees to sue for violation of rule 10b-5 would inevitably
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decision implies that a private remedy for fraudulent nondisclosure
still exists if a fiduciary or corporate insider trades on nonpublic
information, an aggrieved party apparently has no cause of action
in the absence of any relationship of trust and confidence. To a
party injured by a failure to disclose material nonpublic informa-
tion, however, it makes no difference whether the information was
derived from an inside or outside source.147 Any trader with a mo-
nopoly on access to material nonpublic information should not be
permitted to exploit his informational advantage to the detriment
of the less informed.14' The Chiarella rule nonetheless has de-
prived some potential plaintiffs of a private remedy and is indefen-
sible in light of the purpose of the private right of action under
section 10(b). 49
Moreover, a civil action for damages against an outsider for
violation of rule 10b-5 may not lie even if the liability were predi-
cated on a conversion theory. On the facts of Chiarella, for exam-
ple, the fraud was perpetrated on the acquiring corporations,
lead to the subjective inquiry- "Would I have purchased this particular security at the time
it was offered if I had known the correct facts?" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). It is this type of inquiry, however, which is
presented in any pure nondisclosure case. If other members of the Court adopt Justice Pow-
ell's position-if they have not already by espousing the special relationship test in Chiarel-
la-the private cause of action under rule 10b-5 for trading on material nonpublic informa-
tion over a national securities exchange may be judicially legislated out of existence.
147 See text accompanying note 136 supra.
14S Brudney, supra note 81, at 357; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 251
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since the courts have not drawn distinctions between insiders
and outsiders in misrepresentation cases, 3 L. Loss, supra note 44, at 1445, and since no
distinction is made in the language of either section 10(b), see note 2 supra, or rule 10b-5,
see note 3 supra, it appears inconsistent to make such distinctions in nondisclosure cases.
Moreover, with the vast majority of securities transactions conducted on the national securi-
ties exchanges, it is unrealistic to premise 10b-5's duty to disclose on concepts of fiduciary
relationships between the parties. Rather, as Professor Brudney has observed:
[T]he [disclose-or-refrain] rule rests on a broader premise. Another-indeed the
essential-element which makes an informational advantage usable by those who
possess it in dealing with those who do not is the inability of the latter to over-
come it lawfully, no matter how great may be their diligence or large their
resources.
Brudney, supra note 81, at 354. Justice Blackmun apparently subscribes to Professor Brud-
ney's "unerodable-informational-advantage" theory, for in his dissent in Chiarella he states
that rule lOb-5 should be read to prevent "persons having access to confidential material
information that is not legally available to others... from engaging in schemes to exploit
their structural informational advantage through trading in affected securities." Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 & n.16 (9th Cir. 1953); Baird v. Franklin, 141
F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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rather than on the sellers of the target company securities. 50 Since
the defrauded parties were neither buyers nor sellers, they prob-
ably lacked standing under the rule to bring a private action for
damages. 151 Thus, while the conversion theory may be useful in
criminal prosecutions and SEC enforcement proceedings, 52 it will
be of little help to private investors-the persons the federal secur-
ities laws were intended to protect.
Unlike the Supreme Court's previous attempts to limit the im-
plied right of action under rule 10b-5,' the rule announced in
Chiarella is not confined to civil actions for violation of the rule.'"
By seeking to restrict the private cause of action, 55 the Court may
have diminished the power of the SEC to effectively control insider
trading on the national securities markets. Even assuming that a
conversion theory of liability is valid,5 6 certain market profession-
als could trade on nonpublic market information without violating
rule 10b-5, since their information is obtained legally and they
stand in no special relationship to the other party to the transac-
tion. 5 7 Hence, such conduct is not within the jurisdiction of the
SEC. If the Commission is to thwart such activity, additional
rulemaking or Congressional legislation must be forthcoming.'
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, Chiarella v. United States was a difficult case.
No insider had ever been prosecuted criminally for trading on ma-
terial inside information,159 let alone someone in such a tenuous
150 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 235-36. But see note 128 supra.
Ill Tusk, High Court Ruling on Insider Trading Gives Few Answers But Poses Ques-
tions, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 7, 1980, at 5, col. 1; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975); note 146 supra.
See notes 125-129 and accompanying text supra.
13 See note 146 supra.
15 See note 122 supra.
15 See note 146 supra.
1 See notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 130-134 and accompanying text supra.
2 The SEC has recently adopted rule 14e-3, promulgated under section 14(e) of the 34
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. 1 1979), which imposes a disclose-or-refrain rule for
any person who obtains inside information on a tender offer from certain specified sources.
SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 17120, Sept. 4, 1980, reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 82,646. Had rule 14e-3 been in effect at the time Chiarella transacted
on the basis of undisclosed information, his activity would have been covered by the rule.
See id.
159 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1378 (Meskill, J., dissenting). See Arkin &
Arisohn, U.S. v. Chiarella: The Case That Should Not Have Been, Nat'l L.J., May 26, 1980,
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position to the issuer as Vincent Chiarella. Since the Supreme
Court decided the case on the basis of an absence of a duty to
disclose, the due process questions were never presented.16 It may
have been more appropriate to have decided the case on this latter
basis, however, than to have curbed the SEC's authority to deal
with developing forms of illegality in the trading of securities. In-
deed, perhaps the greatest virtue of rule 10b-5 has been its adapt-
ability to encompass the "infinite varieties of securities fraud."
It is easy to criticize the amount of judicial legislation that has
occurred under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Yet, when Congress
opted against enacting a narrowly circumscribed antifraud provi-
sion, it was aware of the ingenuity of the securities bar."'1 More-
over, the antifraud provisions of the American Law Institute's pro-
posed Federal Securities Code162 in large part mirror rule 10b-5.
Indeed, the drafters of the proposed Code recognized that limita-
tions on trading by outsiders on material nonpublic information
"must be left to further judicial development."163 The primary
consequence of Chiarella, however, is to seriously constrain the
ability of the courts to treat nondisclosure situations. The Supreme
Court has thus placed the burden on Congress to draft a more spe-
cific enactment if these new informational abuses are to be cur-
tailed."" In so doing, the Court is forcing the Congress to define
"fraud," the very problem Congress chose to avoid when it enacted
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Frank F. Coulom, Jr.
at 27, col. 1.
140 See note 107 supra. See generally Deutsch, The New Deal and the Burger Court:
The Significance of United States v. Chiarella, 57 Tax. L. REv. 965 (1979).
161 See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 439 (2d Cir. 1943); Archer v. SEC,
133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943).
162 See ALI PROPosED CODE, supra note 102, §§ 1602-1603. The SEC and the American
Law Institute have recently reached agreement on certain revisions in the proposed Code,
and a draft bill is expected to be introduced in Congress in the near future. SEC Exch. Act
Rel. No. 17153, Sept. 18, 1980, reprinted in part in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 82,655.
163 See ALI PROPosED CODE, supra note 102, § 1603, comment 3(d).
'1" See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 218 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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